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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
JIMMIE & ANITA MAE BUTLER, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
Case No. 20060509-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction on one count each of 
theft, a second degree felony, and forgery, a third degree felony 
(R. 388-91) . This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Have defendants carried their substantial burden of 
showing their counsel was ineffective where their claims of 
prejudice are speculative, their briefing is inadequate, and they 
have not shown that counsel's trial strategies were anything but 
legitimate? 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying 
defendants' motion to arrest judgment where the evidence and its 
1 
fair inferences sufficed to prove that defendants committed 
forgery and theft? 
Before a trial court may substitute its judgment for that of 
the jury by arresting judgment, the court must determine that the 
"the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, 
is so inconclusive or so inherently improbable as to an element 
of the crime that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt as to that element." State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 
981, 984 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted) . 
"The decision to grant or deny a new trial is a matter of 
discretion with the trial court and will not be reversed absent a 
clear abuse of that discretion." State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 
220, 222 (Utah 1985); accord State v. Martin, 1999 UT 72, I 5, 
984 P.2d 975 (citing Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937, 
940 (Utah 1993)). In general, an appellate court "will presume 
that the discretion of the trial court was properly exercised 
unless the record clearly shows the contrary." Goddard v. 
Hickman, 685 P.2d 530, 534-35 (Utah 1984)(citation omitted). To 
constitute an abuse of discretion, the trial court's 
determination must be "beyond the limits of reasonability." 
State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 1992). 
In reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
this Court must determine whether trial counsel's performance was 
deficient and, if so, whether the deficient performance 
prejudiced defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
2 
687 (1984); State v. Oliver, 820 P.2d 474, 478 (Utah App. 1991). 
This claim presents a question of law, reviewed on the record of 
the underlying trial. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 11 
16-17, 12 P.3d 92. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
No constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules are 
dispositive in this case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendants were charged with one count each of theft, a 
second degree felony, and forgery, a third degree felony (R. 1-
3). A jury convicted them as charged (R. 203-04, 211-12). Prior 
to sentencing, new defense counsel filed a motion to arrest 
judgment (R. 214-15, 270-72, 286-317). After a hearing, the 
trial court denied the motion (R. 465; R. 347-54 at addendum A). 
Based on the same grounds, defendants then filed a motion for new 
trial (R. 362-64, 365-84). The trial court entered judgement, 
imposed and stayed the sentence, and issued a commitment order 
(R. 388-91). After another hearing, the trial court denied the 
motion for new trial (R. 443-47 at addendum B). Defendants 
timely filed a notice of appeal from the denial of the new trial 
motion (R. 456-57). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Elmer Butler, the 83-year-old victim, spent his working life 
as a real estate developer, subdividing large parcels of land 
into hundreds of house lots and then selling them (R. 463: 46, 
3 
60-61). He understood well the process of conveyancing (Id. at 
61). In 1999, after losing his wealth in a lawsuit arising from 
a fatal pedestrian-truck collision for which he was uninsured, he 
purchased a home in Cedar City with his remaining funds. He 
intended to live there with his wife until they both died (Id. at 
61, 74-75). The warranty deed listed Elmer and his wife of more 
than fifty years, Edna Mae, as joint tenants of the property (Id. 
at 48-49, 53, 96) . 
In March, 2001, Edna Mae died (Id. at 50, 67). About a 
month later, Elmer asked his daughter, Marilyn, to accompany him 
to the title company office to remove his deceased wife's name 
from the title and add Marilyn's name, thus avoiding probate in 
the future (Id. at 67; R. 464: 199). An escrow officer for the 
title company, who had previously worked with Elmer on other 
deeds, testified that she executed both an affidavit severing the 
joint tenancy between Elmer and Edna Mae and a warranty deed 
conveying the property from Elmer to Elmer and Marilyn (R. 463 at 
96-97). She stated at trial, MI think he's the only person in 20 
years that's ever walked through the door with a death 
certificate. Most people come in and ask me what they need to 
do. He actually came in and was specific about the documents 
that he wanted" (Id. at 95). 
That fall, Marilyn was helping her father with his bills. 
Elmer showed Marilyn a tax notice for the property, with the name 
and address whited out, and Elmer's name handwritten in next to 
4 
it (Id. at 68). Marilyn testified: "We held it up to the light 
and it said Anita Butler and Anita's address" (Id.). Anita, 
Elmer's daughter-in-law, was married to Elmer's son, Jimmie. 
Elmer immediately summoned Jimmie to the house (Id.). 
When confronted with the tax notice, Jimmie told his father 
that the house belonged to Anita, that Edna Mae had given it to 
her, and that Elmer had signed the warranty deed while 
intoxicated (Id. at 69). At trial, Elmer vehemently denied ever 
signing the deed or intending to transfer ownership of his home 
(Id. at 47, 48, 61, 63, 69; R. 464: 195). He and Marilyn both 
maintained that Edna Mae would never have given the home away (R. 
463: 53, 69, 72, 74). The warranty deed conveying the property 
from Elmer and Edna to Anita was notarized on April 23, 1999, 
shortly after Elmer and Edna Mae moved into the home. It was 
recorded on April 3, 2001, two weeks after Edna Mae died (R. 
325) . 
The warranty deed was the subject of much trial testimony. 
A school administrator testified that he had notarized around 
fifty documents, mostly wage garnishments, during the five years 
he was a notary. The remaining documents, no more than five to 
ten, were brought to him by school employees or by other persons 
he knew (R. 463: 79-80). He testified that he had no 
recollection of the warranty deed at issue, although it did 
appear to bear both his signature and notary stamp (Id. at 81, 
87). Noting that the deed required the signatures of Edna, 
5 
Elmer, Anita, and a witness, and that he always did notaries in 
his office, he stated, "I'm basically certain I never did a 
notary with four people" (Id. at 83, 84, 87). He also stated 
that he had never seen Elmer prior to the preliminary hearing; 
that contrary to what appeared on the warranty deed, he did not 
use a typewriter to complete documents he notarized; and that his 
log book did not attest to this notary event (Id, at 85, 90, 91) . 
A questioned document examiner opined with "high 
probability" that the warranty deed conveying the Cedar City 
property from Elmer and Edna to Anita was a "simulated forgery," 
with Elmer's name forged by someone familiar with his handwriting 
(R. 463: 115, 126, 139).x The examiner also opined with "strong 
probability" that Edna Mae had signed the document (Id. at 120). 
The owner of a Cedar City title company also testified, 
stating that he had notarized a trust deed in Anita Butler's name 
that secured a loan of $75,000 to her against the Cedar City 
property (Id. at 101-02). Further, a real estate broker 
testified that defendants had tried to sell the Cedar City 
property during the summer of 2002, but that the sale fell 
through because the title was not clear (R. 464: 201-02). 
1
 This witness also testified that another warranty deed, 
not at issue in this case, was similarly forged (R. 463: 115, 
118, 120, 139). This testimony was corroborated by a notary, who 
testified that she had notarized only Anita Butler on the 
document. She was confident the document had been altered 
because the names of Elmer and Edna were added after she 
completed her notarization (Id. at 166-67). 
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Jimmie and Anita's daughter, Hollie, testified on her 
parents' behalf. Twenty years old at the time of trial, she 
stated that "a long time before" her grandmother became ill, both 
her grandparents decided to deed the house to her (R. 463: 186). 
She testified, "They were leaving it to me, and I was a minor at 
the time, so they deeded it to my mom to deed to me after they 
weren't there anymore" (Id. at 181). Hollie maintained that her 
grandparents, Elmer and Edna Mae, as well as her parents, Jimmie 
and Anita, all signed the deed conveying the property "right 
there in front of me" at the Cedar City home (Id. at 185). 
Hollie opined that because Elmer drank "all the time, . . . he 
was probably drunk" when he signed the deed (Id.). 
Based on this evidence, a jury convicted defendants as 
charged (R. at 211-12) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendants contest the trial court's denial of their motions 
to arrest judgment and for a new trial. However, the crux of 
their complaint is that they received ineffective assistance of 
counsel. Their multiple claims of ineffectiveness all fail 
either because their counsel was exercising a legitimate trial 
strategy, because their claim of prejudice was entirely 
speculative, or because their briefing is inadequate. 
Their remaining claim is that the motion to arrest judgment 
was improperly denied because the state failed to prove "a public 
offense" as that phrase is used in rule 23, Utah Rules of 
7 
Criminal Procedure. This argument fails because defendants have 
not complied with the marshaling requirement. It also fails on 
the merits because the evidence, when viewed in the light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict, sufficed to prove defendants 
committed forgery and theft. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
DEFENDANTS HAVE NOT CARRIED THEIR 
SUBSTANTIAL BURDEN OF SHOWING 
COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE WHERE THEIR 
CLAIMS OF PREJUDICE ARE 
SPECULATIVE, THEIR BRIEFING IS 
INADEQUATE, AND THEY HAVE NOT SHOWN 
THAT COUNSEL'S TRIAL STRATEGIES 
WERE ANYTHING BUT LEGITIMATE 
The crux of defendants' claim is that they received 
ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.2 See Br. of Aplt. at 
20-29. They urge multiple instances of ineffectiveness, all of 
which fail either because their counsel was exercising a 
legitimate trial strategy, or because their claim of prejudice 
was speculative, or because their briefing is inadequate. Where 
defendants have failed to demonstrate either deficient 
performance or prejudice, the trial court properly determined 
2
 The claim arose after defendants procured new counsel, 
following trial but before sentencing. At that juncture, counsel 
filed a motion to arrest judgment premised on ineffective 
assistance. When the trial court denied the motion, counsel 
filed a motion for new trial, also based on ineffective 
assistance. Again, the trial court denied the motion. 
Defendants now argue that the trial court erred in denying both 
motions. The dispositive issue, however, is not the propriety of 
the court's denial of the motions, but rather whether defense 
counsel performed ineffectively at trial. 
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their counsel was not ineffective and, accordingly, denied 
defendants' motions to arrest judgment and for a new trial. 
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, 
defendants must demonstrate both that their counsel's performance 
was so deficient as to fall below an objective standard of 
reasonableness and that, but for the deficient performance, a 
reasonable probability existed that the outcome of the trial 
would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 
687; State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186-87 (Utah 1990). 
When reviewing trial counsel's work to assess deficient 
performance, "a[n appellate] court must indulge a strong 
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance." State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 
681, 685 (Utah 1997)(quoting Templin, 805 P.2d at 186 (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689)). "If a rational basis for 
counsel's performance can be articulated, [this Court] will 
assume counsel acted competently." State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 
461, 468 (Utah App. 1993). Thus, "an ineffective assistance 
claim succeeds only when no conceivable legitimate tactic or 
strategy can be surmised from counsel's actions." Id. 
When reviewing trial counsel's work for prejudice, 
defendants must show that "counsel's errors were so serious as to 
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is 
reliable." Templin, 805 P.2d at 186 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 687). Defendants must affirmatively demonstrate prejudice by 
9 
showing a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
deficient performance, "the result of the proceeding would have 
been different." Id. at 187. 
A. Failure to introduce evidence of power of attorney or 
investigate claims of Elmer's drinking 
Defendants first argue that their counsel performed 
ineffectively by failing to introduce into evidence a power of 
attorney, pursuant to which Elmer allegedly gave Edna Mae the 
authority to sign documents for him. See Br. of Aplt. at 20-21. 
Counsel asserts that if the jury had known that Edna Mae could 
have signed the warranty deed for Elmer, the jury would have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the document was forged. Id. 
at 20. This argument fails on the deficient performance prong of 
ineffective assistance because it directly conflicts with 
defendants' theory of the case, which was not that Edna Mae 
signed the document, but that Elmer himself signed it and later 
forgot that he had done so (R.464: 223-24). Indeed, the sole 
witness for the defense was Elmer's granddaughter, Hollie Butler, 
who testified unequivocally that she saw Elmer sign the warranty 
deed in the presence of his wife, son, and daughter-in-law (R. 
463: 184-85). Plainly, then, defense counsel had a "rational 
basis'' for choosing not to introduce the power of attorney. 
Tennyson, 850 P.2d at 468. Had he done so, he would have 
effectively undermined his own theory of defense. 
Defendants next claim that their counsel performed 
ineffectively by not investigating whether Elmer signed the deed 
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while intoxicated. See Br. of Aplt. at 26-27. The defense 
theorized that Elmer intentionally signed the warranty deed over 
to Hollie's mother, Anita Butler, in order to give the house to 
his granddaughter when she reached her majority. For the defense 
to prevail, the jury had to believe Hollie's testimony that her 
grandfather knowingly signed the deed in the presence of his 
family. Had counsel pursued a line of questioning about Elmer's 
drinking, however, counsel would have emphasized precisely the 
part of Hollie's testimony that it wished to underplay. That is, 
while emphasizing Elmer's drinking bolstered the theory that he 
simply did not remember signing the document, it could also 
directly erode the defense theory that he knowingly signed the 
deed. Because counsel had reason to believe that pursuing 
further evidence of Elmer's drinking was a double-edged sword 
that could be harmful to the defense, counsel could reasonably 
decide not to further press the matter. See State v. Montova, 
2004 UT 5, 1 24, 84 P.3d 1183 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
691); see. also State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah App. 
1992)(to establish deficient performance, defendant must show 
counsel's actions "were not conscious trial strategy"). 
The crux of the matter is that defendants' deficient 
performance arguments are premised on a new theory of the case, 
developed only after the jury rendered its verdict and trial 
counsel had been replaced. See R. 211-12; 214-15. Defendants' 
new counsel, aided by hindsight, entertained an alternative 
11 
theory of the case — that Edna Mae signed the document for Elmer. 
However appealing such a theory may now be, it cannot serve to 
establish deficient performance by previous counsel, who acted on 
a legitimate, though different, trial strategy. See, e.g.. State 
v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1241 (Utah App. 1995) ("An 
ineffectiveness claim succeeds only when no conceivable 
legitimate tactic or strategy can be surmised from counsel's 
actions. Moreover, this court will not second-guess trial 
counsel's legitimate strategic choices, however flawed those 
choices might appear in retrospect" (quotations and citations 
omitted)). The law is well-settled that "[a] lawyer's legitimate 
exercise of judgment in the choice of trial strategy that does 
not produce the anticipated result does not constitute 
ineffective assistance of counsel." State v. Wynia, 754 P.2d 
667, 672 (Utah App. 1988)(citing Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 
1101, 1109 (Utah 1983); State v. McNicol, 554 P.2d 203, 205 (Utah 
1976)). For this reason, defendants' claims fail. 
B. Failure to impeach Elmer 
Defendants also fault their attorney for failing to impeach 
Elmer's testimony. See Br. of Aplt. at 21-23. Counsel contends 
that Elmer's failing memory should have been highlighted to the 
jury, and also that trial counsel should have objected to 
"statements that contained strong inferences of guilt . . . [and] 
narratives" (Br. of Aplt. at 22). These unadorned assertions 
fail to establish either deficient performance or prejudice. 
12 
First, on its face, Elmer's testimony made quite clear that 
his memory was less than perfect. He could not accurately 
remember his address, when he moved into his Cedar City home, or 
his age (R. 463: 44-46). Had trial counsel frontally attacked 
Elmer's memory, however, he would have run the risk of being 
perceived by the jury as badgering the 83-year-old victim and 
thus enhancing the jury's sympathy for this elderly man who 
claimed defendants had stolen his home. Tactically, then, where 
the testimony spoke for itself, counsel had good reason to 
refrain from aggressively attacking Elmer. Instead, defense 
counsel wisely let Elmer's failing memory speak for itself. As 
was proper, counsel let the jury assess Elmer's credibility and 
the extent to which his inability to remember basic personal 
information might also indicate faulty memory in other areas. 
See, e.g., Workman, 852 P.2d st 984 (holding that jury serves as 
exclusive judge of witness credibility). 
Second, defendants have not specified which statements 
"contained strong inferences of guilt" or what "narratives" were 
detrimental to the defense. They have thus failed to "identify 
specific acts" falling "outside the wide range of professional 
assistance" that constitute deficient performance. State v. 
Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998)(quotations and citations 
omitted). Moreover, they have not established demonstrable 
prejudice, asserting only that counsel's perceived deficient 
performance "may have prejudiced the jury" or that "the outcome 
13 
of the trial may have been different" (Br. of Aplt. at 22, 23). 
"On many occasions, this court has reiterated that proof of 
ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative matter 
but must be a demonstrable reality." Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 
870, 877 (Utah 1993) (footnote omitted). Having failed to 
specifically articulate deficient performance or demonstrably 
establish prejudice, defendants' allegation of ineffective 
assistance stands as an unadorned and speculative claim. State 
v. Arauelles, 921 P.2d 439, 441 (Utah 1996). Consequently, it 
fails.3 
C. Stipulating to recording of warranty deed 
Defendants argue that trial counsel performed deficiently by 
stipulating to the admittance of the warranty deed without first 
calling as a witness the recorder of the deed, whom the parties 
had stipulated would confirm that Anita Butler requested the 
recording. See Br. of Aplt. at 25; accord R. 263: 174. As a 
matter of course, parties often stipulate to facts that are so 
3
 Defendants' argument that trial counsel was ineffective 
for failing to object to Marilyn's testimony also fails for lack 
of demonstrable prejudice. See Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 
523 (Utah 1994)(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697)(approving 
analysis of prejudice prong only to dispose of ineffective 
assistance claim). Merely alleging that testimony is "highly 
prejudicial" does not make it so. See, e.g., Br. of Aplt. at 24 
("Because [Marilyn] Goldberg's highly prejudicial responses were 
heard by the jury, it severely prejudiced the case"). Moreover, 
lacking any record citations, the issue is inadequately briefed. 
See Utah R. App. P. 24(a) (9). Where an appellant fails to 
adequately brief an issue, a reviewing court may decline to 
consider the argument. See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 1999 UT 2, 1 
11, 974 P.2d 269 (citations omitted); Mackav v. Hardy, 973 P.2d 
941, 947-48 (Utah 1998) . 
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uncontroverted, so clear on their face, that they do not warrant 
the expenditure of further adjudicative resources. Thus, parties 
will often stipulate to facts that one party would otherwise have 
to prove. To establish deficient performance here, defendants 
would have to show that there is evidence contesting the agreed-
upon facts. Defendants have not done so. Absent such proof, 
adduced pursuant to a rule 23B remand hearing, defendants' 
ineffective assistance claim is purely speculative and, 
consequently, fails. Arquelles, 921 P.2d at 441. 
D. Failure to properly analyze evidence 
Finally, defendants claim that trial counsel performed 
ineffectively by failing "to analyze any of the documents 
presented at trial and . . . to undermine any inferences made by 
the notaries as to the alleged alterations of the documents" (Br. 
of Aplt. at 25-26). 
This claim fails because it is inadequately briefed. 
Defendants do not articulate which specific documents they are 
referencing, how those documents should have been analyzed, what 
such an analysis would have produced, and how the results of the 
analysis would have changed the outcome of the trial.4 They have 
4
 Defendants also claim that trial counsel was ineffective 
for failing to object to the use of certified copies of certain 
unspecified documents. See Br. of Aplt. at 28-29. This claim 
fails because they have not specified which documents they are 
referencing or what the originals would have shown that the 
certified copies lacked. Indeed, they virtually concede that 
their claim is entirely speculative when they surmise that "it is 
possible that documentation was used and relied upon that was 
incomplete" and, further, that if the documentation was 
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also not specified what "inferences" either of the notaries made 
that were suspect or what further investigation would have 
revealed. And they have cited no legal authority to support 
their unadorned allegations. 
"A reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly 
defined with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a 
depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of 
argument and research." State v. Gomez, 2002 UT 120, 120, 63 
P. 3d 72 (quotations and citations omitted). NXAn issue is 
inadequately briefed ^when the overall analysis of the issue is 
so lacking as to shift the burden of research and argument to the 
reviewing court.'" Smith v. Smith, 1999 UT App 370, 1 8, 995 
P.2d 14 (quoting State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998)). 
Where defendants have offered briefing that is wholly inadequate, 
neither specifying their claims nor the rationale for the results 
they seek, this Court should decline to consider them. 
POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN DENYING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO ARREST JUDGMENT BECAUSE 
THE EVIDENCE, VIEWED IN THE LIGHT 
MOST FAVORABLE TO THE JURY'S 
VERDICT, SUFFICED TO ESTABLISH THAT 
DEFENDANTS COMMITTED BURGLARY AND 
THEFT 
Defendants argue that the trial court erred in denying 
incomplete, that "may have led to crucial evidence being omitted 
. . . ." (Id. at 28). Such bald speculation has never been 
sufficient to support a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
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their motion to arrest judgment because no direct evidence proved 
that they forged the warranty deed. See Br. of Aplt. at 29-30. 
They phrase their argument in terms of rule 23, asserting that 
"the facts proved . . . do not constitute a public offense." 
Utah R. Crim. P. 23. In essence, however, they argue that the 
evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict. See 
Workman, 852 P.2d at 984 ("The standard for determining whether 
an order arresting judgment is erroneous is the same as that 
applied by an appellate court in determining whether a jury 
verdict should be set aside for insufficient evidence"). 
This Court should decline to address this claim because 
defendants have not marshaled the evidence in support of the 
verdict and then shown why it is "so inconclusive or so 
inherently improbable as to an element of the crime that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to 
that element." Id., (citing State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 445 
(Utah 1983)) . Marshaling requires defendants to gather and 
present, in a light most favorable to the verdict, "every scrap 
of competent evidence . . . which supports the very findings 
[they] resist." West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 
1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991). They must "fully embrac[e] the 
[State's] position" without "simply rearguing and 
recharacterizing" the evidence. State v. Clark, 2005 UT 75, i 
17, 124 P.3d 235 (citations and quotations omitted); see also 
Heinecke v. Dep't of Commerce, 810 P.2d 459, 464 (Utah App. 
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1991)(rejecting appellant's claim where he persistently argued 
his own position while marshaling). Failure to properly marshal 
the evidence suffices to reject a sufficiency claim. See, e.g., 
Clark, 2005 UT 75 at 1 17; State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, f 16, 
989 P.2d 1065; Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 800 
(Utah 1991). Where, as here, defendants have failed to comply 
with the marshaling requirement, they cannot prevail on their 
argument that the trial court should have granted their motion to 
arrest judgment. 
In any event, defendants' claim fails on the merits. While 
they assert that no evidence directly proved that either of them 
forged the warranty deed, they wholly ignore the circumstantial 
evidence and the fair inferences based on the evidence before the 
jury. The victim, Elmer Butler, was an experienced real estate 
professional, familiar with the nuances of conveying property (R. 
468: 57, 60-61, 71). He testified unequivocally that he did not 
sign the home over to Anita and Jimmie and did not authorize 
anyone else to convey the property for him (Id. at 47-48, 61). A 
questioned document examiner testified that Elmer's signature was 
a forgery, written by someone familiar with Elmer's handwriting 
who tried to copy it (Id. at 115). 
Anita Butler recorded the forged deed (Id. at 174). She 
later secured a loan for $75,000, using the deed as security for 
the loan (Id. at 101). Moreover, Anita and Jimmie together put 
the home on the market and tried to sell it during the summer of 
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2002, while the title to the house was still in dispute (R. 464: 
201-02) . Their actions impliedly contradicted the testimony of 
their daughter, Hollie, who was the only defense witness. She 
maintained that Elmer and his wife intended to give the house to 
her and that Elmer signed it over to Anita to hold for her until 
her grandparents died (R. 463: 181). Hollie's testimony directly 
conflicted with the testimony of her grandfather, who stated he 
never intended or discussed giving the home to her (R. 464: 195). 
Evaluating this evidence and its fair inferences, the trial 
court opined: 
The jury had a clear choice. Did they 
believe that the victim signed the deed, that 
he had now forgotten the signing, and that 
the expert witness was mistaken, or did they 
believe that the defendants had prepared and 
uttered the deed for their own gain. They 
obviously chose to believe the latter. It is 
certainly reasonable for the jury to infer 
that the purported grantee and her husband, 
the ones who stood to gain from the forgery, 
and the ones who did gain from the forgery, 
and the ones who would be in a position to 
simulate the signature of the victim, were 
guilty of forging the document, or at least 
uttering the document that they knew to be 
forged. 
R. 353 at addendum A. In denying defendants' motion to arrest 
judgment, the trial court properly deferred to the jury's role as 
"exclusive judge of both the credibility of witnesses and the 
weight to be given particular evidence." Workman,, 852 P. 2d at 
984 (and cases cited therein). Accordingly, where the evidence 
sufficed to support the jury's verdict, the trial court did not 
19 
abuse its discretion in denying defendants' motion to arrest 
judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendants' 
conviction on one count each of forgery, a second degree felony, 
and theft, a third degree felony. 
T^— 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this lj)_ day of June, 2007. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
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vs. 
JIMMIE BUTLER and 
ANITA MAE BUTLER, 
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MEMORANDUM OPINION 
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CASENOS. OCT - 3 2005 
FIFTH D.'STR'CT COURT 
021501176 FS IRCN CCJNTV 
021501175 #<fUTYCLERfc 
The two defendants Jimmie and Anita Mae Butler, who are husband and wife, were tried 
by a jury on February 17, 2005. They were represented at trial by Keith Barnes, their attorney. 
The State was represented by Troy Little, Chief Deputy County Attorney for Iron County. At the 
conclusion of the trial, the defendants were both found guilty of Theft, a 2nd Degree Felony and 
Forgery, a 3rd Degree Felony. A Presentence Investigation was ordered prior to sentencing. 
Thereafter, the defendants retained the services of another attorney, Michael W. Isbell, 
who, on May 9, 2005, filed on behalf of both defendants a Motion to Arrest Judgment prior to 
the sentencing hearing. The State has now filed a written response to that Motion and oral 
argument was held on August 29, 2005. The court took the matter under submission, and having 
now reviewed the file, the Memoranda of the attorneys, and the record of the trial, the court 
enters the following ruling on the pending Motion. 
FACTS 
Although the complete record of the trial has not been transcribed, but is available for 
transcription, a brief recitation of the facts will be helpful to an understanding of the court's 
ruling. 
#n 
The victim in this case is an elderly man, Elmer Butler. The defendants are his son and 
daughter in law. At trial Elmer testified that when his wife, Edna Mae, died in March 2001, he 
went to the County Recorder to take the necessary steps to remove Edna Mae's name from the 
deed to their marital home. When he tried to file the required proof of her death, he discovered 
that the home was no longer in his and his wife's name, but had been deeded to his daughter in 
law, Anita Butler, one of the defendants. The deed which made the transfer of title purported to 
have been signed by Elmer, his wife Edna Mae, and Anita Butler. Jimmie Butler's signature 
appeared on the deed as a witness. 
Elmer testified that he never signed the Warranty Deed which conveyed the property to 
Anita Butler, nor did he authorized anyone else to do so. He claimed that the house had been 
taken from him without his consent. 
The State next called Marilyn Goldberg, a daughter of Elmer and Edna Mae, who testified 
that she had accompanied her father when he went to take Edna Mae's name off the deed. 
The State next called Kent Ferrill Peterson, the notary public whose signature appears on 
the disputed deed. Mr. Peterson testified that he did not remember notarizing that deed, which 
was dated April 23rd, 1999. 
The State next called Jill Orton, an escrow officer with First American Title, who 
testified that she prepared the Affidavit necessary to take Edna's name off the deed and gave it to 
Elmer and Marilyn Goldberg. 
The State next called Mitchell Schoppmann, owner of Cedar Land and Title, who 
testified that he prepared deeds on the property in question, including a trust deed to allow Anita 
Butler to secure a $75,000 loan on the property after the disputed deed made her the record 
owner of the property. 
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The State also called as a witness George Matthew Throckmorton, an employee of the 
Salt Lake City Crime Lab, a crime scene investigator, and a questioned documents examiner. 
Mr. Throckmorton opined that the deed in question had not been signed by Elmer, but that his 
apparent signature was in fact a "simulated forgery", meaning that whoever signed the deed 
would have been familiar with the signature of Elmer and tried to make the signature on the deed 
look like Elmer's writing. In making this examination, Mr. Throckmorton compared the 
signatures on the deed in question, and another deed purportedly signed by Elmer, to known 
samples of Elmer's writing. Mr. Throckmorton concluded that both of the deeds he looked at 
were simulated forgeries, and both were likely signed by the same person. Both deeds purported 
to convey property to Anita Butler from Elmer and Edna Mae Butler. 
Mr. Throckmorton did opine that there was a "strong possibility" that the purported 
signature by Edna Mae Butler on the deed in question was in fact her signature although he could 
not so state conclusively. 
The State's final witness was Mitzi McLeroy, a retired employee of Zion's Bank who 
testified that she notarized the second deed looked at by Mr. Throckmorton. 
After the State rested, the defense called its principle witness, Hollie Mae Butler, who is 
the daughter of the defendants and the grand daughter of the victim Elmer Butler. Hollie testified 
that Elmer was a heavy drinker of alcohol, that Elmer wanted to deed the house to her but she 
was a minor, and so he deeded the house to Anita to be deeded to her went she was an adult. She 
testified that she was present when the deed was signed and she saw it signed by Elmer, Edna 
Mae, and both defendants. She testified that this signing happened before Edna Mae's final 
illness, although she could not give an exact date. 
Neither of the defendants chose to testify. 
3 
In rebuttal, the State recalled Elmer and Marilyn Goldberg, and then called Rhett 
Shakespeare, a local real estate broker, who testified that in June, 2002, the Butlers, Jimmie and 
Anita, tried to sell the house, which was in direct contravention of the testimony of Hollie that 
Anita was holding the house in trust for her. 
At no time during the trial did either side mention the existence of a Power of Attorney 
which purported to give Edna Mae Butler power to sign a deed for Elmer Butler. The court was 
never made aware of the existence of such a document. Certainly, the defendants, if they knew 
of that document, could have raised its existence during the trial. However, if they had done so, 
and then had claimed that the victim's signature on the deed was actually signed by his wife, 
Edna Mae Butler, they would have thoroughly impeached the testimony of Hollie Butler, who 
testified that she saw her grandfather, the victim, sign the deed himself. No one presented any 
evidence to indicate that it was Edna Mae Butler who signed the deed in question for Elmer. 
That argument was never raised until after the jury had rendered its verdict in the case. There has 
never been any evidence presented to indicate that Edna Mae placed her husband's signature on 
the questioned deed. 
PERMISSIBLE SCOPE OF MOTION TO ARREST JUDGMENT 
Rule 23, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: 
"At any time prior to the imposition of sentence, the court upon its own 
initiative may, or upon motion of the defendant shall, arrest judgment if the facts 
proved or admitted do not constitute a public offense, or the defendant is mentally 
ill, or there is other good cause for the arrest of judgment. ..." 
ARGUMENTS OF THE DEFENDANTS 
In their Motion, the defendants raise the following arguments: 
1. The defense presented by defendants' attorney did not rise to the level required of 
competent counsel and was therefore ineffective assistance of counsel. 
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2. The facts proved against the defendants do not constitute a public offense. 
3. The jury's verdict was based upon prejudice and psychological pressures. 
4. The theft conviction hinges upon a forgery conviction. 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
In its response to the Motion, the State of Utah raises first an issue as to whether a claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel can properly be raised by way of a Motion To Arrest 
Judgment. The parties agree that the rule itself does not specifically list as one of the permissible 
grounds for such a Motion a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Therefore, if the claim is 
cognizable under Rule 23, it would have to be under the "other good cause" catchall phrase. 
Neither party was able to find any conclusive law on this question, nor has the court 
located any applicable law which addresses the question directly. The State points out that in 
State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027 (Utah 1991), the Utah Supreme Court has said that 
"...ineffective assistance of trial counsel [claims] should be raised on appeal if the trial record is 
adequate to permit decision of the issue and defendant is represented by counsel other than trial 
counsel" citing State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990) and Jensen v. Deland, 795 P.2d 619 
(Utah 1989). However, the defendants argue that because of the procedural posture of that case, 
the decision in Humphries does not resolve the question presented in this case. 
The State also points out that the Rules of Appellate Procedure now provide a way for an 
appellant to supplement the trial record, if necessary, so that a complete record can be provided 
to the appellate court. [See Rule 23B(a) UR.App.P.] 
In this case, the principle argument regarding ineffective assistance of counsel which 
defendants now advance is that their trial attorney did not present evidence to the jury of a Power 
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of Attorney which the victim had given to his now deceased wife prior to the signing of the deed 
in question in this case. Although it is true that the existence of that document was not presented 
to the jury, the reasons therefore are not now part of the trial record. Those reasons could be 
explored and developed as part of an appeal, pursuant to the above cited Rule of Procedure. If 
the defendants and their trial attorney knew of the existence of the Power of Attorney and chose 
not to use it during the trial because it would weaken the testimony of the principle defense 
witness who testified that she saw the victim sign the deed in question himself, there could be no 
ineffective assistance claim. Rather it would appear that the failure to alert the jury to the 
existence of that document would have been a reasonable and deliberate trial tactic. 
Therefore, under the pronouncement of the Utah Supreme Court, the Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, and in view of the particular facts of this case, the court now finds that the 
defendants' claim of ineffective assistance of counsel should be raised by them on direct appeal 
rather than by way of the Motion To Arrest Judgment. The Motion To Arrest Judgment is hereby 
denied as it relies on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised by the defendants. 
DID STATE PROVE A PUBLIC OFFENSE AGAINST DEFENDANTS? 
Clearly the State presented evidence sufficient that, if it was believed by the jury, it would 
proved that the defendants committed the crimes of which they were convicted. The purported 
grantee of the deed transferring property to Anita Mae Butler testified that he did not sign the 
deed, nor did he authorized anyone to sign for him. Anita Mae Butler apparently signed the 
deed. The defendant Jimmie Butler, husband of Anita and son of the victim, signed the deed as a 
witness to the signatures affixed thereto, including the forged signature of the victim. The expert 
witness presented by the State testified that the signature of the victim on the deed was indeed a 
forgery, perpetrated by one who knew of the victim's signature and one who tried to make the 
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deed signature look like a genuine signature. The forged deed was published (uttered) by the 
defendant Anita Mae Butler and recorded. The defendants' jointly borrowed money on the home 
based on the forged deed, in the amount of $75,000, and later put the home up for sale. These 
acts occurred while the victim continued to occupy the home but without notice to him. 
The defense claimed that the victim did indeed sign the Warranty Deed, probably while 
intoxicated, and that the signing was witnessed by the daughter of the defendants who was also 
the grand daughter of the victim. The jury had a clear choice. Did they believe that the victim 
signed the deed, that he had now forgotten the signing, and that the expert witness was mistaken, 
or did they believe that the defendants had prepared and uttered the deed for their own gain. 
They obviously chose to believe the latter. It is certainly reasonable for the jury to infer that the 
purported grantee and her husband, the ones who stood to gain from the forgery, and the ones 
who did gain from the forgery, and the ones who would be in a position to simulate the signature 
of the victim, were guilty of forging the document, or at least uttering a document that they knew 
to be forged. 
The Motion To Arrest Judgment is denied as it relates to the defendants' assertion that the 
State failed to prove a public offense against the defendants. 
JURY VERDICT THE PRODUCT OF PREJUDICE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PRESSURE 
The evidence presented to the jury was sufficient to convict the defendants of the charges 
against them. There is no evidence in the record that the jury verdict was based on some other 
motive than to do justice in the case. Defendants' assumptions and arguments do not prove that 
the jury was in any way improperly influenced, nor does the court so find. 
The Motion To Arrest Judgment is denied as it relates to that claim. 
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THEFT CONVICTION HINGES UPON FORGERY 
Clearly, the conviction of theft is inseparably tied to the conviction for forgery. The State 
claims no independent basis for the theft charge. However, that statement of fact does not, in and 
of itself, require that the judgment in this case be arrested, since the court has ruled that the 
judgment on the forgery charge should not be arrested. 
THEREFORE, the defendants' Motion To Arrest Judgment is denied. The case should 
be set for sentencing as soon as practicable. 
DATED this 3^\day of October 2005. 
J. FMip Eves, District Court Judge 
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Addendum B 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH
 tv» -mmrv 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ANITA BUTLER, 
Defendant. 
- , />VL^ 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR NEW 
TRIAL 
Case No. 0215001175 
Judge John J. Walton 
The above entitled matter came before the court for hearing on January 18, 2006, for 
purposes of oral argument on Defendant's Motion for New Trial. Defendant Anita Butler 
waived her appearance and appeared by and through her attorney Michael IsBell, and the State 
of Utah appeared by and through Chief Deputy Iron County, Troy A. Little. The court heard 
arguments and reviewed memorandum from both parties. The court enters the following ruling 
on Defendant's Motion. 
BACKGROUND 
Defendants Jimmie Butler and Anita Butler were found guilty of forgery and theft by Jury 
Verdict on February 18, 2005. Defendant now seeks a new trial pursuant to Rule 24, Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
Reference is made to the Memorandum Decision of Judge Eves dated October 3, 2005. 
That Memorandum Decision contains a description of the facts and procedural history of the 
case. 
MOTION UNDER RULE 24 
The court is not persuaded that a Motion for New Trial is the appropriate procedure to 
pursue a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. The court can find no precedent for such a 
Motion. Defendant's Motion is not based on newly discovered evidence. The parties stipulated 
that the evidence Defendant claims should have been presented to the jury was known to her and 
to her counsel at the time of trial. Nor are the grounds traditionally made the basis of a Motion 
for a New Trial alleged in this case. Defendant may pursue her claim for ineffective assistance 
of counsel on appeal. 
COURT'S PRIOR DECISION 
The court finds that Defendant's Motion (or a near duplicate of the current motion) was 
previously filed by the Defendant pursuant to Rule 23, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (as a 
Motion to Arrest Judgment) and was denied by Judge Eves. The court finds the reasoning in 
Judge Eves' decision persuasive in denying Defendant's Motion for New Trial. The 
Memorandum Opinion dated October 3, 2005, is, therefore, incorporated herein. 
DEFENDANT'S SUBSTANTIVE ARGUMENT 
Defendant's claim is that her trial attorney should have presented evidence to the jury of a 
Power of Attorney allegedly granted by the victim to his now deceased wife. The Power of 
Attorney was allegedly given to the victim prior to the execution of the deed the Defendant's 
were found to have forged or uttered. The Defendant argues that since the victim's wife 
apparently signed the deed that there would be no reason for Defendants to forge the victim's 
signature. In short, the victim's wife could have transferred the property to the Defendants on 
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her husband's behalf pursuant to the Power of Attorney. 
As Judge Eves previously ruled, Defendant's attorney's trial strategy was likely tactical. 
Evidence of the Power of Attorney would have been at odds with the Defendant's key witness 
who testified that she saw the victim sign the deed. Therefore, evidence of the Power of 
Attorney may have been deemed contrary to the Defendant's most exculpatory evidence. 
Defendant's other arguments claiming ineffective assistance of counsel were not 
emphasized by Defendant at oral argument and the court finds that each constitutes second 
guessing and conclusory allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant's current 
counsel may have tried the case differently, butJ:he decisions of trial counsel cannot be 
successfully challenged by simply claiming that a different procedural or substantive strategy 
should have been followed. 
The court finds that there is not sufficient evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel as 
required by Strickland vs. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 
There has been no showing that counsel errors were so serious that Defendant's attorney was not 
functioning as counsel as guaranteed the Defendant by the Sixth Amendment. There has been no 
showing that a deficient performance prejudiced the defense or that counsel's conduct or his trial 
strategy so undermined the proper function of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be 
relied on as having produced a just result. 
By granting the Defendant's Motion the court would be doing what Strickland prevents, 
i.e... second-guessing trial counsel's strategic choices, however flawed those choices might 
appear in retrospect. Nor has there has been a showing that but for defense counsel's 
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unprofessional errors the result of the proceedings would have been different. Strickland, 466 
694. 
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE 
The basis of Defendant's remaining arguments are not entirely clear but appear to be that 
no public offense was committed, or that the Jury's Verdict was not supported by the facts of the 
case. 
The court finds that there is sufficient evidence in the record on which the Jury could have 
reached its Verdict. First, the court notes that Defendant should have marshaled the evidence in 
support of the Jury's Verdict in attempt to demonstrate that the Verdict is not supported by the 
record. The Defendant has not done so. In fact, Defendant has simply argued the evidence in a 
manner most favorable to her position. 
The court finds that the Jury had a choice: did they believe the victim signed the deed, 
forgot the signing and that the expert witness was mistaken, or did they believe that the 
Defendants prepared and/or uttered the deed for their own gain? The Jury's conclusion as to the 
latter is supported by facts in the record. 
The court finds that this Motion was denied by Judge Eves when previously captioned as a 
Motion to Arrest Judgment. Notwithstanding the different standard that may be appropriate for 
ruling on a Motion for New Trial, the same reasoning that Judge Eves applied in denying the 
Motion to Arrest Judgment is applicable to Defendant's Rule 24 Motion for New Trial, and the 
court incorporates Judge Eves' Memorandum Decision herein. The verdict is supported by the 
evidence and there is adequate evidence that a public offense was committed. See Memorandum 
Opinion of October 3, 2005. 
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The Defendant's final claim is that the Defendant's theft conviction hinges on an 
improper forgery conviction and should be set aside. However, the Court finds that the Jury's 
forgery verdict is supported by the evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Defendant's Motion for New Trial is denied. 
Dated this *f day of May, 2006. 
JOHN J. WALTON 
District Court Judge 
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